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Pipeline Politics and Energy (In)security in Central and 
South-Eastern Europe  
 
Dr Eamonn Butler 
 
Introduction 
This essay concerns energy security, or more specifically energy insecurity, in Central and South-
Eastern Europe. Insecurity can be defined as being in a situation where vulnerability from a 
particular danger or threat is perceived to exist. Threats generally come from external sources, but 
can also come from within and usually have an existential quality. Energy is existential because it 
underpins modern life – we use it to provide power, heat and light to our homes, work-places and 
cities; to fuel our cars and other forms of transport; to help produce and power technology; and 
even to help us grow and process the food we eat.  Therefore, energy is a critical resource and as 
such it is a commodity of significant strategic importance.  The main concern that has driven the rise 
of energy insecurity has been ‘security of supply’. This refers to the ability of states and other users 
to guarantee sources of affordable energy, sufficient to meet their needs across all economic and 
business, societal and even politico-military activities. Energy insecurity exists when internal actions 
or those by third parties actors or even natural disasters threaten to, or actually do disrupt the 
supply or affordability of energy.  
Energy insecurity is not unique to Central and South-Eastern Europe. The region shares many 
concerns with other parts of Europe and states across the globe, however, because of the historic 
legacies of the region’s communist past some of the vulnerabilities and threats it faces are 
pronounced. For example, the region is highly import dependent for fossil fuels such as oil and 
natural gas1, with some states importing as much as 60-100% of their needs from a single supplier, 
Russia. Monopolisation of the market by Russia as the primary supplier means that long-term bi-
lateral export/import contracts tend to be less price favourable resulting in higher energy costs. The 
mix of energy types used by states in the region is considered to be less diverse than in Western 
Europe, meaning that any disruption to their primary energy type could be problematic. This is 
especially so, when we acknowledge that the region’s import infrastructure is dominated by static 
pipelines built during the Soviet era and that integration with Western European infrastructure is 
limited. Without suitable alternative energy access or adequate storage, any problem with the 
pipeline or with the source of gas (or oil) entering the pipeline can have serious knock on effects for 
importing states downstream. The importance of pipelines cannot be underestimated. They have 
provided the Central and South-Eastern European region access to oil and gas for decades and this 
has formed a mindset for how the region accesses much of its energy needs. Until recently, the 
situation was more problematic for natural gas because the expense and lack of technical capability 
to liquefy and regasify natural gas meant that its transportation was only realistically capable via 
pipelines. As a liquid, oil could be transported via tankers, meaning oil pipelines were not as critical, 
                                                          
1
 For example, other than Romania, nearly all Central and South-Eastern European states are dependent on 
natural gas imports, with almost 100% imported by Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.    
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although they remain by far the cheapest and quickest means to transport oil and most suitable for 
some of the region’s landlocked states. As a result of these issues, Central and South-Eastern Europe 
is considered to be the most vulnerable region of Europe with regard to energy security.  Even those 
states with substantial domestic energy sources, such as Poland (coal and lignite) have become 
increasingly reliant on imports of low-carbon fuels like natural gas, as they seek to meet strict EU 
climate change and targets for CO2 emissions reduction.  Much of this natural gas has also been 
imported by pipelines. In order to better understand how pipeline politics plays a role in creating 
challenges and vulnerabilities for Central and South-Eastern Europe’s energy security, as well as 
informing policy solutions, we need to consider the region’s relations with its primary and potential 
energy suppliers, such as Russia, and with its partners in the wider European Union (EU).  
 
Energy and the European Union   
In Europe, until recently, there has been a growing demand for energy. It is considered that energy 
consumption levels within the European Union, peaked around 2005 (see table 1) and improved 
efficiency of energy use is predicted to result in further reductions in energy consumption over the 
coming years.  Interestingly, in comparison with the EU as a whole, the Central European states 
energy consumption levels peaked much earlier than their western counterparts.  By 2035 domestic 
production of primary fossil fuels is also predicted to fall, with oil by 57%, coal by 49% and natural 
gas by 46%. This would cancel out the predicted fall in consumption levels. As a result it is assumed 
that energy imports will remain constant at around 55%; of which natural gas imports will increase 
by around 49%. This means that the European Union is likely to remain the world’s largest net 
importer of natural gas. It is important to note however that the levels of imports are not balanced 
across all EU member states, with some countries importing much more than others which have 
domestic resources available.  Overall the EU imports around 60% of the gas it uses and 80% of the 
crude oil.  The majority of these imports come from a small group of states, Russia, Norway and 
Algeria, and because of the nature of the EU’s infrastructure and geographic proximity, these 
supplier states tend to direct their products to clusters of EU members. As already mentioned, the 
Central and South East European States are predominately supplied by Russia.  When energy 
imports are concentrated among a few supplier states, there is increased risk of vulnerability should 
external matters result in disruption to supply and sufficient alternative mechanisms to counter that 
disruption are not in place. For a number of Central and South-Eastern European states this is 
exactly what happened in 2006 and again in 2009 when Russia suspended gas sales to the Ukraine. 
This was problematic because Ukraine provides one of the primary transit routes for Russian gas 
imports. These two Russia-Ukraine gas-crises and the fact that the majority of Central and South-
Eastern European states were now members of the EU, is often used to explain why the EU has 
become more involved in energy matters and why energy has increasingly become an area of 
integration activity at the European level.   
The story is a little more complex though. Energy has always been important for the European 
integration project, from its foundation as the European Coal and Steel Community, through 
Euratom to the European Energy Charter Treaty, the European Energy Community to the most 
recent development of the European Energy Union. There have always been ebbs and flows in the 
intensity of policy development but since the 1990s and early 2000s interest in energy has grown 
significantly at the European level.  Import dependency has not been the only driver of this rapid 
expansion of energy interests. The promotion of market liberalisation and growing concern for 
environmental matters and climate change have also been hugely important.  This tri-partite 
justification for the increased interest in energy, can also be used to explain the EU’s securitization 
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of energy. It is necessary to recognise that there has also been a fluctuating hierarchy of importance 
across these three drivers.  
In the early 2000s it was very much the latter two drivers (market liberalisation and the climate 
agenda) that were most significant. Questions about supply did exist, but it is important to note that 
they tended to be framed more in the context of market forces and were about ensuring affordable 
supplies and improving the connectedness of market infrastructure to ensure regular supplies at 
reasonable prices in light of growing demand. Diversification of suppliers was primarily about 
opening the market to competitive forces and preventing monopolistic pricing structures. This is not 
to say that questions over transit routes or reliability of suppliers were not a concern, rather they 
were not the priority.  Fears about rouge suppliers ‘turning off the tap’ were not on the agenda and 
Russia was more or less regarded as a safe and secure supply partner.   
Central and South-Eastern European states fell in line with this general EU position and this was 
evident in the language they used at the time.  Acutely aware of their energy challenges primarily 
stemming from their time behind the Iron Curtain, and in advance of their accession to the European 
Union the Central European states initiated cooperative efforts to support their integration into the 
wider European energy market. For example, in 2002 the Visegrad Group (V4) under the presidency 
of Hungary initiated the V4 Energy Working Group as a means to support the ministries of economy 
in the V4 states to improve cooperation across the energy sector.  The main purpose was to improve 
information exchange to support market liberalisation across the region, speed up privatisation 
strategies and ensure the maintenance and expansion of storage facilities – all demands of the EU on 
the Central European candidate states. Improved interconnections with Western Europe were also 
recognised as necessary to support market integration.  
Diversification away from Russian supplies was not considered a rationale for this type of 
cooperation. When diversification was mentioned it was viewed as ‘in addition to’, rather than 
‘instead of’ Russian supplies. It was about choice and price.  As the then Hungarian Prime Minister 
Ferenc Gyurcsány stated, ‘Mad would be the country which was happy about depending on a single 
supplier for the purchase of a strategically important service and product’, highlighting the fact that 
replacing Russia as a single supplier with an alternative single supplier would not resolve the 
fundamental challenges informing energy insecurity.  This could be recognised when proposals were 
put forward in 2002 for a major new pipeline that was intended to open up the European market to 
natural gas from the Caspian and Central Asia regions. The consortium behind this pipeline, which 
become known as the Nabucco Pipeline, initially involved Austria and Turkey but quickly included 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, highlighting the importance of these countries as transit states for 
the new pipeline and the opportunity for them to benefit from access to the piped gas.  All three 
states are highly dependent on Russia for their gas imports and pay a premium price via take-or-pay 
contracts with Russia.  Having additional sources of gas imports would potentially give these states 
increased leverage in any future gas contract negotiations. 
 
The emergence of pipeline politics – Nabucco v South Stream 
Nabucco was developed in response to the discovery of the Shah Deniz gas field the Caspian Sea in 
1999. At 330 sq miles Shah Deniz is one of the largest new oil and gas fields to be discovered in 
recent years and it began production in 2006. Nabucco was intended to provide transit of natural 
gas from this field to Europe and was at first considered a commercial venture, but it was not long 
Draft chapter for ‘The Europa Regional Surveys of the World 2016: central and southeastern Europe’ 
 
before the project took on a political undertone, although for Russia, it always held political 
connotations.   
The Nabucco project was problematic for Russia because it threatened its effective monopoly on gas 
imports to Europe, specifically Central and South-Eastern Europe. As Russia’s biggest customer, it 
doesn’t help Russia if that customer has alternative suppliers, thus giving opportunity to bargain on 
price. For Europe this is exactly what Nabucco was intended to achieve – increase competition and 
lower prices. For the EU and its member states two things happened to alter their position towards 
Nabucco and shift it from being a predominately commercial venture to a political one.  
The first was the first Russia-Ukraine gas crisis in 2005-2006 which saw disagreement over the price 
of gas to be paid by Ukraine result in the suspension of gas flows from Russia to Ukraine for 4 days. 
As Ukraine is the major route through which gas destined for the European markets transits, the 
disruption to levels of gas, exacerbated by Ukraine siphoning gas intended for European markets, 
resulted in a significant drop in supplies. For some Central European states this was a serious 
problem. It highlighted their failure to ensure adequate stored gas supplies and emphasized their 
over reliance on Russia as single supplier. Furthermore, the trustworthiness of Russia as a supplier 
and Ukraine as a transit state, which had previously been accepted, was now brought into question 
in a way it never had before. 
The second matter was the emergence of alternative competitor pipeline projects promoted by 
Russia. Initially Russia had suggested an extension of its Blue Stream pipeline via Turkey as a way to 
provide an additional access point for Russian gas into Europe. It eventually decided against this and 
in 2007, it announced the South Stream project which would run a pipeline under the Black Sea and 
up through Bulgaria, Serbia and into Hungary supplying Europe with 63 billion cubic metres of gas. 
For Russia, South Stream did two things; firstly, it sought to reinforce Russia’s dominate position as 
the primary gas supplier to Central and South-Eastern Europe, and open possible new opportunities 
by providing Russia with a southern access point to its European markets without having to go via 
Ukraine. This dovetailed with the Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic Sea running direct to 
Germany and providing 55 billion cubic metres of natural gas per year. By establishing both these 
projects, Russia was essentially claiming that it could remain a viable and reliable partner by 
providing new transit routes. In doing so it effectively sought to accuse Ukraine as the transit state 
as the problem. Secondly, it allowed Russia to pit its project directly against Nabucco and seek to 
prevent its monopoly on gas supplies from being eroded too quickly. It claimed that South Stream 
would be more competitive and not cost as much to build. It also created uncertainty for possible 
investors because it raised questions about the sustainability of two competing pipelines.  
Russia failed to convince many in Europe that it could be trusted and rhetoric which made reference 
to energy as a foreign policy tool as well as some of the actions undertaken by Russia towards 
energy importing and transit states have fuelled the rise of a discourse in western political, academic 
and media circles that emphasises ‘the new cold war’, ‘energy wars’ and ‘energy weapon’.  Energy 
was now highly political. In the southern corridor space, the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline 
projects suddenly found themselves framed as Europe versus Russia, thus emphasising political 
tensions. Of course it was not quite so straight forward because key EU member and candidate 
states from Central and South-Eastern Europe were partners in both projects, thus adding to the 
complexity of the situation.  
Nonetheless, what we see in Europe during this time is a clear shift in the framing of energy as a 
security concern with pipeline politics seen as a crucial element in this development. A second 
Russia-Ukraine gas crisis in 2008-2009 reinforced this concern about security of supply for Europe 
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and specifically for the Central and South-Eastern European states. We can however question the 
ultimate success of this securitization of pipelines within the wider energy security discourse.   
Nabucco was prioritised as a high level European project with clear political and security rationales 
and was supported by the EU and the USA.  Why it became so politicized was in part due to the need 
to secure political backing and justification for funding support. This was coupled with its 
identification as a possible signature project by the European Commission, which was seeking to 
develop its energy policy competencies, both internally and externally. The Russian-Ukrainian gas 
crises, the urgency to diversify supplies and growing concern about Russia’s use of energy and 
pipelines as foreign policy tools, allowed the project to be securitization as a means to introduce 
alternative suppliers, break Russian monopoly and ultimately curtail Russia’s ability to use energy for 
political moves. The securitization of the Nabucco pipeline project effectively prolonged its existence 
in a way that standard commercial projects would not have been able to do. Yet despite this 
apparent wealth of political support, the commercial viability remained key and no matter how 
much political backing if the numbers did not stack up it was not going to move forth. This is exactly 
what happened and Nabucco effectively stagnated as a project. The strange thing is that everyone 
knew this, yet there seemed to be some sort of collective denial and whenever anyone did say 
something or suggest that the project was not likely to come to fruition as some of the more 
frustrated Central European states did they were castigated and shamed as being anti-European or 
not supportive of energy solidarity in Europe.  
 
Pipeline politics – economic versus political rationales 
The need for projects to have commercial viability resulted in other competitor pipeline projects 
emerging to challenge both Nabucco and South Stream. The most significant of these was the 
Azerbaijani-Turkish owned Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) which was announced in 
2011 and would effectively replace the need for much of the Turkish section of the original Nabucco 
project. This forced the Nabucco consortium to re-evaluate their proposal. The rebranding of 
Nabucco as ‘Nabucco West’ reflected the truncation of the project as a spur pipeline from TANAP up 
through Central and South-Eastern Europe. This revised project looked more achievable and even 
economically viable, but the ongoing economic crisis and the investment of SOCOR (the Azerbaijan 
state owned oil and gas company) in Greece where it purchased 66% of the Greek Transmission 
Network Operator in 2013, may have had an influence on the 2013 decision by the SOCOR-led Shah-
Deniz consortium to award a contract for the transit of TANAP gas to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline 
(TAP) rather than Nabucco West. TAP had initially been proposed as early as 2003 as a pipeline built 
via Greece and Albania to Italy and following the award of the contract the TANAP consortium 
purchased shares in TAP reinforcing it as the official extension of TANAP in Europe. TAP had been 
placed in direct competition with Nabucco West which was to run further north, as the primary 
route for the European section of the southern energy corridor. The politics held by the Central and 
South-Eastern European states and the EU that drove the need for Nabucco were not shared by 
Azerbaijan and its Shaz-Deniz/TANAP partners; so it was not surprising that a more modest project 
with a seemingly higher investment return was selected. This leads us to question the relationship 
between commercial activity and political requirement. If something is so important it warrants the 
type of prioritizing that Nabucco received then that has to be supported by relevant financial 
investment for political means. This did not happen for Nabucco which was predicated by the need 
to adhere to market-led forces. Political neutrality is required if the market is to operate as it should. 
Herein lies the paradox – energy policy cannot be politically neutral.  European states know this, as 
does the European Union and when the market is allowed to take precedence it will adversely affect 
Draft chapter for ‘The Europa Regional Surveys of the World 2016: central and southeastern Europe’ 
 
the ability of states to ensure big infrastructure projects of strategic (if not commercial) importance 
are fulfilled. This is one of the big challenges for Europe and for those Central and South-Eastern 
European states that need improved infrastructure but can’t always rely on the market providing it.  
How do you balance the economics with the politics? 
 
The problem of South Stream 
The failure off Nabucco West to win the Shah-Deniz contract effectively meant that the project 
became untenable. This meant that if southern corridor gas was to reach Central and South-Eastern 
Europe then the possible options would have to be via either a secondary spur from TAP, perhaps 
into Bulgaria, and Russia’s South Stream project.  
Although a Russian backed project, South Stream had the support of a number of Central and South-
Eastern European states, including Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia as 
well as Italy and Austria. This highlights the fact that Russia remains an important strategic partner 
for these states within the energy sector. Each of these states had signed contracts with Russia to 
complete the various primary and secondary parts of the pipeline along its European section. 
Despite the enthusiasm of the Central and South-Eastern European states for South Stream, the 
project faced a number of challenges including accusations from the European Commission in 
December 2013 that the contracts signed between the Russia and the EU states, including Serbia 
which is a member of the European Energy Community, were in violation of the EU’s Third Energy 
Package regulations concerning ownership of pipelines by natural gas extractors and right for third 
party access to the pipeline. Then in June 2014, the project was effectively stopped due to a 
European Commission infringement procedure against Bulgaria concerning non-compliance with EU 
procurement requirements. Bulgaria had also been threatened with possible sanctions by the USA 
due to the participation the Russian company, Stroytransgaz, in the consortium awarded the 
contract to build the Bulgarian section. At the same time, like Nabucco before it, there were 
questions over the financial viability of the project. Competition from other energy projects and 
sectors (such as the increased adoption and affordability of Liquefied Natural Gas - LNG) was 
creating a more challenging environment where long term contract and fixed pipelines become 
expensive and inflexible. Ongoing political tension due to the Russia-Ukriane conflict following the 
annexation of Crimea by Russia and the imposition of Western sanctions on Russia also impacted the 
project and in December 2014 Russia announced that it was dropping the project in favour of 
working with Turkey on a new pipeline project.  
 
Implications for Central and South-Eastern Europe 
The cancellation of both Nabucco and South Stream has had significant implications for Central and 
South-Eastern Europe. Firstly, it highlights that their perceived energy needs, even when framed in 
strong security terms, are not strong enough to override financial realities. Economics trumps 
politics. It also reconfirms that this part of Europe is likely to remain reliant on Russia and that routes 
via Ukraine are likely to continue to be important for the foreseeable future unless possible new 
land-based routes such as that proposed to run through Turkey or spurs from TAP are developed.  
When considered in terms of diversification of supply and access to new sources of gas, this is 
potentially problematic for the region, however, it has also forced the Central and South-Eastern 
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European states to carefully consider new responses to their energy insecurity in a post-Nabucco 
and Post-South Stream context.   
To be fair, the Central and South-Eastern European states have been astute enough to understand 
that their energy security could never be entirely reliant on the southern corridor pipeline projects. 
Those projects if they had come about might have given some long-term stability of supply, but they 
would not have resolved the other key problems they face in terms of energy insecurity – specifically 
their integration into the wider EU energy infrastructure. A north-south corridor had been identified 
as a major missing link in this infrastructure allowing connection of various energy systems (gas, oil 
and electricity grids) from the Adriatic in the south to the Baltic in the north. With the demise of the 
big project southern corridor (not taking TAP into account) this north-south corridor has become 
even more essential. Indeed, the concept of north-south has been extended to what the EU calls 
north-south-east, where the promotion of a series of smaller energy infrastructure projects would 
allow for the development of a ring-road connecting the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas. This would 
be done by investing in existing infrastructure and building reverse flow interconnectors between 
states cross the region. The Central European states have been promoting this idea for some time 
but until recently it has always played second priority to the big pipeline projects. As it turns out it 
may play a more significant and relevant role in supporting the development of energy security for 
the region. The fact that these interconnectors allow for reverse flow should allow for a sharing of 
gas resources in times of stress.  
Financing of these small-scale projects has also been problematic and the Central and South-Eastern 
European States have looked towards the EU for financial support. The EU recognises that there are 
occasions when such projects need financial support and to its credit it has been more supportive of 
these type of projects because they can be delivered quickly and effectively than the ‘grand pipeline 
projects’, such as Nabucco. The need to ensure improved infrastructure is also important because it 
allows the region to benefit from LNG as an alternative supply piped gas.  The Baltic States or 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are a good example of a former ‘energy island’ region that has sought 
to use LNG as a means to provide access to gas from other suppliers. There have of course been 
problems in agreeing the location of LNG terminals in the Baltic region, highlighting the fact that 
states still see great benefit in being the host of energy facilities. For Central and South-Eastern 
Europe, a new LNG terminal has come online in Poland and another is planned in Croatia.  The 
Croatian terminal is proving problematic in terms of the speed of its planning with feasibility studies 
only currently being carried out despite the idea for a terminal being around for quite some time. 
The plan is that the two terminals – Poland and Croatia – would be connected by 2020 allowing the 
so called North-South corridor to be completed.  
Other ways that the Central European states have sought to improve their position has been through 
increased gas storage. Most of the states in the region learned a harsh lessen in previous Russia-
Ukrainian gas crises, and the concern about a possible reduction in supplies following the 2014 
Crimea crisis appeared to justify that moves to increase storage for critical points of the year was 
working. All states in the region successfully coped with a simulated stress test on their gas supplies 
run by the European Commission in 2014 and suggestions stemming directly from that exercise 
which stated that improvements to regional infrastructure should be completed faster has led to the 
establishment of the ‘Central East South Europe Gas Connectivity High Level Group’ which first met 
in February 2015.   
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Conclusion 
What we have seen in the face of the collapse of the large scale pipeline projects designed to 
improve the energy insecurity of Central and South-eastern Europe is that smaller practical solutions 
appear to allow the region to respond more effectively and quickly.  They are more easily financed 
and can be completed in a more manageable timeframe. As such they perhaps suggest that the big 
pipeline projects are not always the best solution to energy insecurity and can actually increase that 
insecurity.  
Does this mean that pipeline politics and energy security has been over-played in Europe? On one 
hand yes, perhaps it is. Caught up in a cycle of geopolitical power play it was easy to over emphasis 
the security threat to Europe’s energy, but in reality when it comes down to it, Europe and the 
Central and South-Eastern European region have been able to respond and develop alternative 
solutions. But there is more to this story concerning the EU, its member states and its neighbours. 
Energy will remain one of the fields in which politics continues to be played out and this impacts the 
ability of the EU to speak with one voice. The South Stream project clearly highlighted that EU 
member states do not necessarily all agree with each other. South Stream prior to its cancellation 
proved to be a real dividing line between the EU institutions such as the Commission and some of 
the Central and South-Eastern European States – specifically Hungary and Bulgaria.  This raises 
questions about concepts such as energy solidarity in Europe and the commitment of member states 
to abide by the EU’s market regulations in the field of energy.  Therefore it will be interesting to see 
how the EU’s proposed European Energy Union which was announced in February 2015 operates. 
The Energy Union is intended to  strengthen the EU’s role in negotiating on behalf of its members 
and improving the solidarity concept and promoting free movement of energy through a completely 
integrated and liberalised market as a fifth freedom, alongside the right of establishment and 
freedom to provide services, and the rights to free movement of goods, workers and capital. While 
this should improve the ability of EU and its member states to better engage with Russia and other 
big suppliers, but it also faces continued resistance from some members.  
Overall, although as stated at the start of this essay, Central and South-Eastern Europe is considered 
to be the most vulnerable region in Europe for energy insecurity, the reality is that the level of 
insecurity may be over-stated. Certainly, the region has faced clear problems and the geopolitical 
and geo-economic gameplay surrounding large-scale pipeline projects did not help to lessen that 
insecurity. However, the use of alternative technologies including LNG and renewables, as well as 
promoting smaller pipeline interconnector projects and overall greater regional cooperation has had 
a positive impact on the region’s ability to address its greatest energy security challenges.  
Differences of opinion and policy preferences do remain and national self-interest may still challenge 
a common European position, but it is unlikely that the region will in the future face the same level 
of energy insecurity that it experienced during the 2006 and 2009 Russia-Ukraine energy crises.   
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Table 1: European Energy Gross Inland Consumption (million tons of oil equivalent) 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 
C
SE
E 
EU
 m
e
m
b
er
 s
ta
te
s 
Bulgaria 48.7 53.9 59.3 59.0 61.3 57.8 54.8 56.7 
Czech Republic 49.9 41.7 41.1 45.1 44.7 43.0 42.8 42.2 
Estonia 9.9 5.5 5.0 5.6 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.7 
Croatia 9.0 7.1 7.8 8.9 8.6 8.5 8.1 7.8 
Latvia 7.9 4.6 3.9 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.5 4.5 
Lithuania 15.9 8.6 7.1 8.7 6.8 7.0 7.1 6.7 
Hungary 28.8 26.2 25.3 27.6 25.8 25.1 23.6 22.7 
Poland 103.3 98.8 88.6 92.2 100.7 101.0 97.8 98.2 
Romania 58.1 46.3 36.6 39.2 35.8 36.6 35.4 32.3 
Slovakia 21.8 17.7 18.3 19.0 17.9 17.4 16.7 17.3 
Slovenia 5.7 6.1 6.5 7.3 7.2 7.3 7.0 6.9 
W
e
st
 E
u
ro
p
e
an
 E
U
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
st
at
e
s 
Austria 25.0 27.1 29.0 34.4 34.6 33.6 33.7 33.8 
Belgium 48.7 53.9 59.3 59.0 61.3 57.8 54.8 56.7 
Cyprus 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.2 
Denmark 17.9 20.2 19.7 19.6 20.0 18.6 18.0 18.1 
Germany 356.3 341.6 342.3 341.9 333.0 316.7 318.6 324.3 
Ireland 10..3 11.1 14.4 15.3 15.2 13.9 13.8 13.7 
Greece 22.3 23.9 28.3 31.4 28.7 27.8 27.7 24.4 
Spain 90.1 102.1 123.6 144.2 130.0 128.3 127.8 118.8 
France 227.8 241.8 257.5 276.7 267.6 258.0 258.3 259.3 
Italy 153.5 161.8 174.2 187.5 174.8 172.0 166.3 160.0 
Luxembourg 3.5 3.3 3.7 4.8 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.3 
Malta 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.0 0..9 0.9 1.0 0.8 
Netherlands 66.7 72.7 75.5 81.5 86.6 80.2 81.8 81.2 
Portugal 18.2 20.6 25.3 27.5 24.3 23.6 22.5 22.6 
Sweden 47.4 51.5 48.9 51.0 50.8 49.7 49.8 49.1 
United Kingdom 210.6 222.3 230.5 234.0 212.2 198.1 203.0 201.1 
 EU-28 1667.3 1671.1 1726.8 1824.7 1760.6 1698.1 1686.1 1666.3 
 Norway 21.4 22.8 26.4 27.2 34.4 28.4 30.1 33.7 
SE
E 
n
o
n
-E
U
 Albania 2.6 1.3 1..8 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.6 
FYR Macedonia 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.0 2.7 
Montengro 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 
Serbia 19.6 13.6 1.7 15.7 15.6 16.2 14.5 15.0 
Turkey 52.3 62.1 76.7 85.6 106.9 113.9 119.8 118.8 
Source: Eurostat (online data code: nrg_100a) 
